
The title of Roudometof's text is somewhat misleading, and the reader should not expect a thorough study of either nationalism, globalization or Orthodoxy. Rather, the result of the book is what may be considered an effective deployment of each of these concepts in a thesis designed to counter myths about Balkan nationalism. This objective proceeds from a conception of globalization as not merely a 20th-century phenomenon, but as a process beginning in the 1500s (when the world began 'moving toward becoming a single place'), followed by modern and post-modern phases. This periodization informs the structure of the book, and constitutes a pillar of Roudometof's thesis in two ways. First, in rejecting a linear view of modernity with globalization at its tail end, we are open to perceiving differing routes to modernity and the particular paths taken by the Balkan nations. Second, considering that Balkan nationalism developed through the exportation of Western ideals of national emancipation and via their diffusion across future national boundaries, we see nationalism as a product of rather than necessarily in conflict with globalization.
Far more tangible an argument against generalizations of a backward, conflict-prone Balkan character exists in Roudometof’s multi-dimensional historical analysis of the individual Balkan revolutions. Critical specificities of each case are revealed through the complex interaction between such factors as relative influence of the West (to what extent did Enlightenment ideas and Western European intervention affect each movement?); timing (how did the gradual devolution of the Ottoman Empire and inter-Balkan relations shape the revolutions?); class relations and land-ownership patterns (how did economic interests determine the agents of each nationalist uprising?); and religion (in what ways was religious identity redeployed in these nation formations?).

For instance, the Greek independence movement especially benefited from Western European ideological and practical influence. The Great Powers showed comparatively less interest in the case of Serbia, which gained full independence nearly 50 years later. Furthermore, the early Serb revolts were largely a response to the administrative disintegration of the Ottoman Empire; national sentiments were more or less absent before the 1840s. The threat of Greek and Serb encroachments was a shared mobilizing factor in the belated cases of Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia (an urgency which also shaped the form of their movements, with less emphasis paid to the fashioning of national myths). Italian and Hapsburg support against the latter encroachments significantly advanced the Albanian movement. Besides intra-Balkan tensions, Bulgarian nationalism was also stimulated by the 19th-century Ottoman reforms which eliminated the janissary corps and thus stripped away a source of intimidation and fiscal oppression.

This brings us to the relative economic interests determining participation in the revolutions. Because neither Greek nor Serb prelates were large landowners, they had little to lose in terms of wealth and power and thus joined the revolts. In the Danubian principalities where, unlike in the Ottoman Empire, a hereditary landowning class existed, uprisings were led by peasants seeking to advance their socio-economic position; their efforts met with strong opposition from the boyars (gentry), who saw revolution as a direct threat to their class interests. Yet careful attention to historical detail reveals that ideological conflict cannot be reduced to class difference. Greek merchants, peddlers, intellectuals and other petit-bourgeois groups promoted the new Enlightenment ideas through educational endowments, but shunned revolutionary activity that might jeopardize their fortunes. A distinction may even be drawn within the merchant classes: a global and mobile capitalist class reaped financial benefits from assimilation to their host countries, whilst a second group, comprised of small merchants and peddlers, migrated for economic reasons but intended return to the homeland. The latter especially cultivated nationalist feelings in the early 19th century.

The role of religion in these revolutionary movements is especially diverse. Though not thus elaborated by Roudometof, his historical study brings to light crucial fluctuations in redeployment of Orthodoxy. For instance, the 1821 revolutions spreading across the Balkans were construed as rebellion of the Orthodox millet against the Muslim Ottomans—that is, primarily based on religious and not ethnic identity. Yet the revolutionary movement did not win the support of the Patriarchate: enjoying greater temporal power than in Byzantine times, the Church condemned the ‘godless Voltaires’ for promoting
ideas that could upset the Empire’s order. Meanwhile, the establishment of national Orthodox churches was motivated by distinct nationalistic intentions. For example, the Bulgarian Exarchate was more an anti-Greek than anti-Muslim advancement. In the Greek case, King Otto sought to transfer the Church’s powerful hold over the populace from the Ottoman-controlled Patriarchate to the national level. But his implementation of a state-sponsored church based on the German model met with considerable distrust amongst Eastern Orthodox conservatives resisting Western trends. The Patriarchate’s eventual approval of the Greek national church eased the tensions, and Orthodoxy emerged as an effective mobilizing force in the Greek irredentist movement. Likewise, religion was determinedly invoked in efforts to unite the Serbians with the Hapsburg and Ottoman Slavs under a common culture. By contrast, the Macedonian struggle for a unifying sense of identity was governed more by ethnic identity than religion, as Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece each struggled for influence over ‘their’ masses. Orthodoxy was even less emphasized in the national cause of religiously divided Albania.

All of the above shows considerable inconsistency in redepolyments of religion, except in their domination by relative nationalistic priorities. In this sense, the role of Orthodoxy in Balkan nationalism is little different from the historical politicization of Islam in the Balkans (contingent on local socio-religious make-up and intra-Balkan influences) or, yet, from the political uses of religion in Western Europe. This perspective, in the long run, best serves Roudometot’s aim to counter Huntingtonian ideas of religion-based civilizational divides, calling rather for further research on the global phenomenon of political uses of religion. In general the text represents an impressive historical contribution in its multi-dimensional approach, incorporating economic, institutional and cultural variables. Greater still is its potential theoretical contribution, a potential which largely rests in the reader’s efforts to glean lessons from the rich historical detail offered.

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