
Because the concepts of secularisation and modernisation have been constructed on the basis of historical trajectories of a selected group of Western nations and have ignored non-Western regions, the question is which theory adequately includes Orthodoxy as well? Sociologist Victor Roudometof believes that globalisation, not modernisation, provides the overall framework for the presentation and analysis of the transformations of Orthodox Christianity in world history. Using the notion of glocalisation, this book is among the few publications that attempt to include Orthodox Christianity in scholarly discussion and to offer new theoretical insights into the religion–globalisation relationship. The view of the global is ‘always a view from somewhere, and in this book, it is the view from within the religious and cultural landscape of Orthodox Christianity’ (p. 8).

Roudometof explores ‘the tension between the universal claims of a world religion and the particular realization of this claim into concrete eras, cultural milieus and institutional context’ (p. 172). There are four different types of glocalisation: vernacularisation (blends religious universalism with specific languages); indigenisation (blends religious universalism with particular ethnicity); nationalisation (blends universal religion and national particularism); and transnationalisation (the global construction of nation-states necessarily created the category of ‘transnational’).

He views Orthodox Christianity as a religious tradition, not as a civilisation or as one of multiple modernities. Analysis shows the fragmentation of Christianity in which he stresses that Orthodox Christianity emerged as a full-fledged distinct tradition in the centuries after the 1204 sack of Constantinople (p. 47).

Roudometof also observes how Orthodox Christianity responded to its encounters with nationalism and modernity. The author reminds the reader that most scholars accept that ‘modern nations must be understood not solely in terms of an ethno-national real or imagined lineage but also in terms of possessing a civil society that enables people to govern themselves’ (p. 82). During the course of the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment’s intellectual currents influenced the intelligentsia of the Ottoman Empire’s Orthodox Christian’s confessional community (Rum millet) and, with several other factors, contributed to the rise of nationalism among the Ottoman Empire’s Orthodox Christians. These social currents entailed the ‘secularization of worldviews’ (p. 71). Looking closer, Roudometof points out that in the modern era ‘correlation of the territorial and the nationality principle essentially implied that an autocephalous church should be established within a nation-state’ (p. 81). In the nation-states of Southeastern Europe, the religious categories of the Ottoman millet system were transformed into classification of national membership (cultural transformation), while structural transformation of religious institutions was accomplished largely via the construction of separate national churches (p. 86). Finally, he claims that the adoption of the Lutheran state church model is itself one of the major indicators of church modernisation.
While modern nationalism spread throughout Southeastern Europe in the nineteenth century, no similar development was observed in the Russian Empire. That is possibly due to a *plurality* of responses of Orthodox Christianity. Cases of the Orthodox Church of Greece (OCG) and Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (ECG-PATR) – which operate as a *transnational* institution for ethnic Greeks – show us that the two institutions adopted different views with regard to *territorialisation* and *globality*. Orthodox theologians affiliated with ECG-PATR acknowledged the problematic nature of globalisation, but they tended to view it ‘as a challenge and not as a threat’ (p. 146), while national churches, like OCG, defend both territorially based community and the *modern synthesis* of church and nation.

Orthodoxy is a branch of Christianity identified with tradition as such. Roudometof illustrates throughout the book both the ability and the willingness of Orthodox institutions to change with the times and the fact that whenever a major shift occurred, the major issue was the problem of conservative dissent or a rift with the most devout and conservative among the faithful. The fact that some of these movements – from Old Believers to the Old Calendarists – declared themselves more Orthodox than the official Orthodox establishment and were against the Church hierarchy ‘shows that the religious hierarchy has been sufficiently willing to modernize’ (p. 76).

Not only does *Globalization and Orthodox Christianity* concisely interpret complex social processes in the broadest historical context, but the author precisely determines implications of offered research: a) The relationship between the individual and the supernatural has not been considered; rather, religion is viewed as an ‘important aspect of culture’ (p. 157); b) Because the ‘book has been deeply engaged with the past’ (p. 172), Roudometof excludes an attempt to discuss the most recent trends within Orthodox Christianity or to predict future’s trends. Keeping it all in the mind, Victor Roudometof has managed to provide a very interesting and incredibly insightful read for anyone interested in the intersection of culture, religion and globalisation.

Having in mind that some Orthodox countries are within the European Union (EU), some are candidate countries and the others do not see themselves in this process, this book may encourage social scientists to explore *plurality of Orthodox responses* to those globalisation processes manifested in the EU project.

SLOBODAN VASIC

*University of Novi Sad*


How do various ethnic minority groups in China come to contest or adapt to Chinese national identity? Enze Han struggles with this question in *Contestation and Adaptation: The Politics of National Identity in China* by analysing different political strategies adopted by five major ethnic groups in China with regard to their negotiations of national identity with the Chinese state. Challenging the conventional approaches that focus overwhelmingly on policies and practices of the authoritarian Chinese state, Han argues that ‘domestic factors alone are not sufficient enough for political mobilization’ and international factors that ‘condition ethnic groups’ preference formation as well as their propensity for national identity contestation’ are even more important (p. 147). Developing his own theoretical framework that includes two independent variables – if
an ethnic group is economically better-off than its external kin relations and whether
the group receives substantial international support – Han aims to systematically
examine politically active cases together with the other nonactive cases to unveil ‘how
different groups have resisted or acquiesced in their dealing with the Chinese state and
majority Han Chinese society’ (p. 19).

After laying the theoretical foundation of his study and presenting the main theo-
retical configurations in Chapter 1, Han succinctly outlines in the second chapter the
general situation of ethnic politics and nation-building efforts in China by picturing a
historical narrative and recent developments. With this background information in
place, the following five chapters proceed to analyse five major ethnic minority groups
to explore what role external cultural ties and international supports play in the making
of each group’s national identity contestation and adaption process. Han finds out that
four of his selected groups – the Uyghurs, Koreans, Mongols and Dai – all fit relatively
well into one of the framework’s four scenarios. Both the Uyghurs and Koreans
perceive evident economic, cultural and political appeal of their external kin relations,
but the Uyghurs receive vast ideological and material support from abroad to facilitate
their actual national identity contestation, whereas the Koreans do not acquire any
external support that aims to politicise their cause. The Mongols, on the other hand,
observe better political and cultural alternatives in the country of Mongolia, but they
do not consider it as being able to present a stronger economic model, nor do they
receive any explicit support from their external kins. Thus, the Mongols in general did
not and do not tend to actively contest the Chinese national identity. In contrary to the
Uyghurs, although the Dai have cultural relations outside China, the bleak political
and economic situations in Burma and Laos encourage the Dai to cherish the benefit of
being part of China, so that they are willing to adapt themselves to the Chinese national
identity and even to become assimilated. The Tibetan situation is chosen as a theory-
testing case to demonstrate the general validity of Han’s theoretical framework. By
delineating the Tibetan identity contestation movement in the past 60 years, Han
persuasively shows that international support plays a crucial role in the pattern of
political mobilisation of the Tibetan nationalists. The book ends up with two policy
implications proposed by the findings of this book: to prevent ethnic separatism, the
Chinese state should improve the living conditions of ethnic minority groups and seek
means to restrict possible external support they receive from outside.

In a novel approach to studying how external factors interact with domestic politics
in the making of ethnic minority groups’ decision to contest or adapt national identity
in current China, Han innovatively creates a theoretical framework concentrating on
external kin ties and their comparative living conditions, and international support for
mobilisation. Utilising data collected through his field researches in China, Han offers
an insightful empirical analysis that demonstrates a positive correlation between vari-
ations in these independent variables. Han convincingly shows that the group’s external
kin relations and its perceptions about the relative strength of competing states are key
factors in accounting for the variation in its decision. International support is another
deciding variable that affects whether and how a group will pursue national identity
contestation.

A point of contention may be that one of Han’s proposed policy implications is to
restrain ‘the international space for dissenting ethnic groups’ (p. 150). Such suggestion
is certainly welcome, yet one may wonder how China can adopt a more assertive
foreign policy but at the same time improve diplomatic relations with potential sup-
porters of domestic ethnic groups – most of these countries are actually the external ties
of these groups. Although the Chinese government has in the recent years ‘courted favor with countries such as Nepal with regard to Tibet, and Central Asia with regard to Xinjiang’, will all of China’s neighbouring countries really ‘cut off the external support certain ethnic groups [in China] receive’ (p. 150)?

This minor caveat aside, *Contestation and Adaptation* is a very informative and insightful book, and few will come away without picking up new ideas. Han’s sophisticated elaboration of the complexities of national identity contestation and adaptation among various ethnic minority groups in China has raised the level of debates in China’s nation-building. Packed with substantial information and convincing arguments, this book is a good read not only for those who work in China studies but maybe even more so for scholars on other cultures and comparative topics like ethnic politics, national identity and political mobilisation.

**HANG LIN**

*University of Hamburg*


Could an academic paper issued by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1986 have been the catalyst for the wave of nationalism that plagued the former Yugoslavia and lead to the wars from 1991 to 2001 that eventually saw its break-up? This is only one of the many questions that academics are grappling with as the post-mortem of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia is being carried out in academic quarters. One such post-mortem was detailed in *Nationalism and the Rule of Law: Lessons from the Balkans and Beyond*, where Iavor Rangelov examines nationalism in the context of transnational/international justice in order to determine ‘how nationalism works to subvert the rule of law’ (p. 13). Rangelov uses the emergence of Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia as independent states to tell a tale of ‘ethno-nationalism’ in the shadows of the rule of law. Or in other words, the fundamental question for Rangelov was the ‘relationship between nationalism and the rule of law’ (p. 6) where he uses a ‘broad analytical lens that goes beyond the legal domain to capture the interactions of law, politics, and public discourse’ (p. 12) buttressed by field research to the region to develop his arguments. The work is captured in a six-chapter monograph where he begins by examining the notion of ethnic citizenship against the hybrid transnational/international justice. To do this, Rangelov uses the first three chapters to lay the theoretical platform for his arguments. He then uses Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, as case studies in the remaining chapters, to draw distinctions on the ‘dark’ moments in their quest for independence and complying with the rule of law as sovereign states.

Nationalism is a powerful tool in state formations and often nationalism is a tool to subvert internationalism or the international judicial process. Rangelov is able to capture how deep-rooted nationalism was used differently by Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia for different purposes. For Croatia, nationalism was a tool to come to terms with war crimes (p. 141), and in the Slovenian context, nationalism was seen as essential for a homogenous state. Perhaps the most vivid of Rangelov’s account of nationalism is the account of Serbia where cooperation with the international judiciary was paramount – and Serbia was able to use nationalism to paint a picture of the world as

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‘anti-Serb’. But it was in this vein that Serbia failed to see the downside of nationalism and when Kosovo declared its independence, Serbia traded cooperation with the international court for Kosovo. The politics of justice is often intertwined with how a nation-state wants to present itself to the outside world and also whether it wishes to acknowledged heinous war crimes through a reconciliation process. One such method could be through truths and reconciliation commissions and the author only suggests that steps were being taken by non-government organizations (NGOs) (p. 194) in that direction.

Rangelov’s book transcends international law and politics and because the central theme – nationalism – goes ‘beyond the nation state’ (p. 192), this was crucial to how the narrative evolved. The former Yugoslav states at the heart of the study have been essentially the catalyst in the resurgence of self-determination at the turn of the twenty-first century and Rangelov develops a comparative assessment of ethnic citizenship within the broader notion of nationalism to demonstrate how ethnic citizenship and identity politics create and define nations as actors in international law and politics. But ethnic citizenship also has its drawbacks because if ethnic citizens constitute a minority in a sovereign state then a state may abuse its power arbitrarily to ensure that it has a homogenous population.

One of the interesting narratives of the work is the story of the ‘erased’, where Slovenia in the early 1990s wiped more than 25,000 permanent residents from its population registry when they did not opt for Slovenian citizenship, thus rendering them stateless: ‘The erasure is grasped at the intersection of two dynamics that are simultaneously at play, one associated with an ethno-nationally framed state-building project from “above” and the other with popular anti-immigrant sentiments from “below” ’ (p. 118). Critics and supporters of nationalism may see this argument as useful to their cause; however, the problem of the erased in Slovenia which Rangelov discusses is a fundamental flaw that undermines the principles of international law and relations.

Although the rest of the narrative in the book captures the transition of Croatia and Serbia via ‘consensus’ rule of law – that is, cooperation with the European Union and the international judicial process for war crimes – the book does not construct anything new in that area, at least from the realm of international law. In addition, the field work – which comprises mostly interviews that failed to do justice to what is otherwise a notable contribution of how the Balkans transformed to ‘Europe’ (p. 130). One important point that is raised but never fully developed was that the Serbian Academic Memo (p. 123), which was allegedly responsible for Serbian nationalism. This was perhaps an academic smoking gun for the Balkan wars in the early 1990s. Had this theory been fully explored in the book, the roots of the conflicts that the region experienced as it shed communism would have provided a more powerful argument for the tensions between nationalism and the rule of law. But from a significant point of view, Rangelov’s book, which is suitably for the undergraduate to read as introduction to Balkan studies or an NGO policy maker to get a broader insight during the dark period of 1991–2001, exposed nationalism in a part of the world where even their integration into Europe will take significant coercion for a mental and ideological attitude that stretches more than 500 years to disappear.

P. SEAN MORRIS
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The existing debates on the links between nationalism and warfare in modernity have extensively focused on biological, cultural, economic and political sources of this relationship. In this edited chef-d’œuvre, John Hall and Siniša Malešević bring together a number of world-class social scientists and historians to study the relationship between nationalism and warfare. Charting a complex picture where the development of nationalism and warfare often goes hand in hand with broader historical and social transformations, the volume explores the impact of imperial legacies, education, welfare regimes, bureaucracy, revolutions, popular ideologies, geopolitical change and state breakdown on the transformation of war and nationalism. It argues that the relationship between nationalism and war changes depending on which historical period and geographical context is in question.

Analysing a broad range of cases and adopting various analytical approaches, the volume is organised in four parts. In part one (Fighting for the Nation?), Randall Collins, adopting a historical sociology approach, is set to examine if nationalist sentiment does increase fighting efficacy. Even though nationalism could provide the motivating ideology for a large number of soldiers, Collins argues that there is little evidence that nationalism makes troops fight better. According to Collins, the processes that affected fighting efficiency are the changes in military organisation, technology and tactics that happened in the period overlapping with nationalism (p. 31).

Part two of the volume (The Varieties of Nationalist Experience) examines the interplay between war and nationalism in different national contexts. Looking at the regional causes of war, Benjamin Miller argues that an underlying cause of state war-proneness is the state-to-nation balance. Defining this balance on terms of state strength and national incongruence, Miller shows that the level of state strength together with the level of national incongruence tells us a great deal about states’ war-proneness. Adding a comparative flavour to this part of the volume, Matthew Lange successfully compares Canada and Sri Lanka, arguing that nationalism has only limited motivational effect in environments with abundant resources and effective and non-discriminatory political institutions (the case of Canada), and it intensifies the grievances caused by economic scarcity and ineffective and discriminatory political institutions (the case of Sri Lanka).

In the third part of the book (Empires and Nation-States), John Darwin challenges the orthodox view that ethnic consciousness sees empire as the enemy and shows that it can actually be the opposite. Asking ‘Does nationalism cause war?’, Michael Mann examines the two World Wars and provides a sceptical account of the commonly assumed relationship between nationalism and war. According to Mann, the predominant causal relation in the two World Wars was that the war generated nationalism, not vice versa (p. 194). In the following chapter, Wesley Hiers and Andreas Wimmer explore if nationalism is the cause or consequence of the end of Empire, and find a mixed record. Examining the cases of Habsburg, Ottoman, British, French, Soviet and Portuguese empires, they find that the role of nationalism on imperial collapse was different across these cases.

The last part of the book (Empty Shells, Changed Conditions) swiftly takes the reader from the internal wars and nationalism in Latin American (Chapter 11) to war and nationalism in Central Africa (Chapter 12) to civil war and national identity in Finland and Ireland (Chapter 13). While the chapters’ authors are respective area

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specialists and well-established scholars, their analyses did not successfully crystallise that ‘critical’ historical period or geographical context that defined the relationship between nationalism and war in their respective case studies. Moreover, war and nationalism in the Middle East and Asia are completely left out.

Regardless of the mentioned shortcomings, the volume succeeds in its main goal. It effectively shows that the relationship between nationalism and war is indeed dependent on historical and geographical contexts. As many chapters in the volume make it clear, including the introduction by John Hall and Siniša Malešević, the general notion that nationalism causes war is quite wrong. Wars have been fought for thousands of years before the advent of nationalism (p. 1).

*Nationalism and War* is a timely and well-written volume that deserves broad read. The volume is a major contribution to the study of nationalism and a valuable title for the under/graduate course on nationalism. Theoretically rich and historically informed, this volume will be essential to nationalism scholars and anyone interested in understanding the link between nationalism and war.

PERPARIM GUTAJ
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There is a vast literature of the populism and indigenous movements in Latin America. However, the recent rise of indigenous parties and their electoral successes (in some cases, very spectacular) have not been a subject of wide academic consideration. Raúl Madrid tries to fill this gap by focusing on the mechanism behind the emergence of the indigenous parties and the reasons why some of them have been successful while others have failed. According to Madrid, the approaches that concentrate on the institutional reforms and the decline of the traditional parties in Latin America, and treat them as the main causes of the emergence of indigenous parties, can be useful in explaining the formation of these parties but not their electoral performance. Furthermore, they fail to fully explain the success of some of these parties and the failure of the others within the same countries, and why some of these parties have managed to win the significant support of non-indigenous voters.

The main argument of Madrid’s book is that the key to understanding this problem lies in the political strategy used by the indigenous parties, which combines inclusive ethnic and populist appeals. These parties have used a variety of ethnic appeals to attract indigenous voters. An example of this strategy is the nominations of numerous indigenous candidates on their electoral lists or invoking to traditional indigenous symbols and maintaining close ties with indigenous movements and organisations. However, to succeed on the national level, indigenous parties must go beyond the indigenous movement and electorate and appeal also to the voters of other ethnic backgrounds by forging ties with numerous non-indigenous leaders and organisations in order to develop a broad, inclusive populist platform. Thus, populist strategies should be considered as the main component of the efforts of those indigenous parties that succeed to attract voters from different ethnic backgrounds. Similar to such subtypes or subordinate categories of populism like traditional populism or neoliberal
populism. Madrid uses in this case a term of ethnopopulism, which refers to a campaign and governing strategy in which politician or parties combine ethnic and populist appeals or policies.

Raúl Madrid looks for a confirmation of his arguments through an examination of indigenous parties in seven Latin American countries – Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela and Nicaragua – with a major focus on the first three. He examines the varying electoral performance of these parties over time and across the space by analysing their political strategies. For this purpose, he employs two principal research methods: qualitative methods to carry out case studies of individual parties in order to examine how the appeals of these parties changed over time and how these changes affected their electoral results; quantitative methods to examine voting behaviour on different levels (from individual to provincial) and to explore who supported particular parties and under what circumstances.

One of the strongest examples in support of Madrid’s line of argument is the rise and decline of Pachakutik in Ecuador. Author argues that Pachakutik fared well in the initial elections (1996–2002) because of skillful combination of inclusive ethnic and populist appeals. Pachakutik forged a broad alliance with non-indigenous parties, organisations and politicians and developed an anti-establishment platform. These strategies appeared to be crucial for the party’s good electoral performance, attracting many indigenous as well as non-indigenous voters. However, in 2006, the party took more ethnonationalist and exclusive direction, which eventually led to Pachakutik’s poor electoral performance and subsequent political decline.

In the last chapter of the book, Madrid examines the impact of indigenous parties, especially the Bolivian Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement for Socialism), on democracy. He argues that the parties’ ethnic policies have deepened democracy in some ways whereas the populist tendencies have weakened democracy. However, as the concept of populism is highly elusive and vague, thus its positive or negative impact on democracy is also controversial. For some liberal thinkers like Gino Germani, populism and democracy are incompatible and antagonistic, and some identify the first as a form of authoritarianism. Nevertheless, such point of view is based on an idealised notion of liberal democracy and cannot explain the rising level of popular participation in elections and satisfaction with democracy in those Latin American countries, which are ruled by populist regimes (de la Torre and Arnson 2013: 33–4). Moreover, many populist leaders claim to be devoted democrats appealing to the people’s sovereignty as the essence of democracy. Therefore, the relation between populism and democracy seems to be more ambiguous and problematic than simply antagonistic. For Margaret Canovan, populism and democracy are closely related. She argues that modern democracy has two opposed but interdependent faces: pragmatic (includes complex of institution that regulates people’s peaceful interactions within political community) and redemptive (that promises salvation through politics) and that between them lies a gap in which populism is liable to appear (Canovan 1999: 2–16). Francisco Panizza also underlines this ambiguity and states that ‘populism is neither the highest form of democracy nor its enemy, but a mirror in which democracy can contemplate itself warts and all, and find out what it is about and what it is lacking’ (Panizza 2005: 30).

Madrid’s book is a scientific study mostly dedicated towards readers interested in Latin American ethnic issues. Nevertheless, it could also be a good lecture for those who want to deepen their knowledge about contemporary Latin American politics in general.
NORBERT NOWAKOWSKI

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The cover of this book shows Goya’s painting about the 1808 riot against the Mamelukes in Madrid, which started the War for Independence. Such riots are considered as the norm given the antipathy and mistrust towards alien rule due to nationalism and the resulting claim for self-determination. Throughout the book, Hechter investigates why in some cases alien rulers faced stiff nationalist resistance while in other cases they did not. He thus opens to debate the definition of ‘alienness’ in order to highlight the socially constructed nature of ‘alien rule’. Typically, alien rule is thought as indifferent, if not inimical, to domestic interests and culture. By bringing in the question of legitimacy and social order, Hechter criticises such taken-for-granted pejorative understanding of alien rule. Rulers (including alien rulers) can increase their legitimacy in the eyes of the domestic public and ensure peaceful compliance by providing effective and fair governance. Hechter’s account is of particular relevance today, which witnesses the rise of public protests in different parts of the world due to domestic governments’ inefficiency and corruption.

Hechter suggests broadening the definition of alien rule which, in his opinion, is particularly important under the conditions of globalisation. By putting strong emphasis on the culturally heterogeneous nature of national societies, Hechter explains that all central rules imposing a single set of norms and policies on a domestic society are deemed to be seen as alien by several groups within the society. He discusses whether indirect rule, which allows central rulers to delegate partial authority to local rulers, prevents insurgency better than the top-down direct rule where the central government is the only authority that provides the citizens with collective goods (such as welfare benefits, government jobs, public health and education) and enforces laws and policies. Through different case studies from world history such as the Iraqi state under the Ottoman, British and Saddam rule, Hechter concludes that indirect rule is not a panacea (p. 53). In this context, ‘there is no universally optimal choice of governance structures for the attainment of order’ (p. 55). While direct rule motivates local traditional authorities who lost their privileges to mobilise nationalist resistance against central rulers, indirect rule may empower local authorities promoting secession.

Arguing that ‘nationalist resistance to alien rule varies across time and space’, the book offers different case studies from the past and contemporary world politics.
Chapter 3 compares the legitimacy effects of direct and indirect rule in Iraq under Ottoman, British and Saddam governments, which is a must-read to students of Gulf wars and ethnic conflict in Iraq. Chapter 4 deals with a case of alien rule imposed by military force in the pre-World War II era. It investigates why the Japanese military occupation sparked stronger nationalist resistance in Korea than Taiwan. Focusing on the relations between alien and native elites, the chapter argues that it is difficult for native elites to mobilise nationalist self-determination movements in case of fair and effective rule by alien rulers. Chapter 5 investigates the question of ‘collaboration’ of domestic actors with alien rulers. An important example offered by the book is the Palestinian collaboration with Israeli authorities in the West Bank. It provides photos of public humiliation scenes against people who collaborated with the Nazi regime. The remaining two chapters (6 and 7) add value to the book in terms of highlighting the sociological character of this research as they introduce the case of alien rule in smaller scale organisations, including academic receivership, corporations and stepfamilies. The section of academic receivership – the imposition of an outsider as a department chair in a university – is authored by Gail Dubrow and Debra Friedman from the University of Washington.

This book is complementary to Hechter’s previous works on internal colonialism and nationalism. Hechter proposes to think more seriously about the possibility for an emerging market of transnational governance involving efficient and fair ruling by aliens. His emphasis on legitimacy and fairness in this context deserves serious attention as efficiency and rational choice do not guarantee domestic obedience. It is thus crucial to grasp the dialectical relationship between efficiency and legitimacy, which renders alien rule acceptable (or not). Overall, in addition to the rich empirical case studies, the book’s main theoretical value relies upon its problematisation of the taken-for-granted notion of alien and its innovative thinking about the variation in nationalist attitudes towards alien rule. Last but not least, the book is easily accessible to all, including readers who are not familiar with the literature on nationalism. Its references to contemporary cinema (e.g. the Brazilian movie City of God at page 51) and music (e.g. Katy Perry’s song ‘E.T.’ at page 13) to illustrate theoretical notions are a positive feature that reflects the book’s engagement with the popular modern culture. Because of its broad scope and the richness of its international examples, this book is strongly recommended to students of nationalism in sociology, politics and international relations.

DIDEM BUHARI-GULMEZ
Oxford Brookes University


The artificial chronocentric barriers that exist between historians and their chosen periods of study afford no favours to students and scholars of national identity. Thus, it is still common for scholars to assert that the idea of national identity in Germany cannot even begin to be entertained until the end of the eighteenth century. Germany, with its historically dizzying multiplicity of statelets within the Holy Roman Empire and the late nation-forging of an opportunistic Bismarck, certainly offers a different paradigm to established sovereign states such as England and
France, with even some medievalists declaring that ‘judged by its success in creating a nation-state, German history has to be deemed a failure until the nineteenth-century’ (Waley and Denley 2001: 83). But then some medievalists are still languishing out-datedly in the shadows of the Gellnerite school and the modernist Sonderweg.

Thankfully, Len Scales is not one of them. This book, the first on the topic in any language, accumulates his research into a true magnum opus, which convincingly presents his thesis through persuasive arguments and exemplification. He has long been making his case in a series of important papers that medieval Germany requires another look when it comes to national identity, and if we do not see it in centralised institutions and authority, we should recognise ‘Germanness’ in its local context. Scales’s argument is, in simplified form, that the long period of ongoing crises in the late medieval Reich focused minds and stimulated ideas of Teutonic cohesiveness among its people and towards the Empire. He opens his book with a lengthy and pretty pugnacious pop at German historiography on the country’s formation as a nation. His criticisms are harsh but justifiable given the modern record, and he might easily have been more trenchant: German historians in the nineteenth century were practically a branch of government, something which alarmed the Germanophile English historian John Seeley; and the enormously influential (and obnoxious) Treitschke receives just two sentences. This is followed by a national political history of Germany in this period, comparing it with the differing developments of England and France as sovereign states, one such difference being the growth in the Empire of regional administrative features (as in Vienna, Prague and Munich) compared with national growth either side of the Channel. Nonetheless, the sense of natio began to emerge, as numerous contemporary sources attest. This was clear to outsiders and to those who ventured beyond the Empire in the repeated mentions of Theutonia, Alamania and Dudesche lande. As Timothy Reuter has shown, there was a clear idea of German identity from foreigners referring to Germans as an identifiable group, using such terms as teutisci, in the ninth and tenth centuries; it should therefore not be controversial for Scales to make his eminently reasonable claims for the later medieval period. Furthermore, the misleadingly fissiparous nature of Germany prompted, posits Scales, greater political attention on the overarching unifying figure of the Emperor. (Some reference here to Weiler’s Kingship, Rebellion and Political Culture: England and Germany, c.1215–c.1250 and the subject of imperial loyalty might have been useful.) Scales also delves into the theoretical debates of the period, especially in Rome and Paris, pondering on the suitability of German emperors to run a Roman empire; of itself, this further delineated Germanness. This awareness encompassed the ambiguities of the first emperor, Charlemagne, and how he was portrayed as either Frankish or German.

The languages spoken within Germany receive substantial commentary. Scales believes that the complexities here, especially with the profusion of vernaculars and dialects, mitigate the role of a mother tongue: ‘Far from being an organic reflection of some “primordial” national culture, even the concept of a single “German” language was highly artificial, problematic and apparently arbitrary in its scope’ (p. 502); he also argues its development was highly politicised. He cites the bewilderment of Abbot Peter of Königsaal at how Saxons and Bavarians were both deemed German even though they could not understand each other’s speech. However, by the thirteenth century, there was a proliferation of vernacular romances and epics, which surely had some impact on audiences across Germany. Vitally, the central role of war in shaping identity
is given some consideration in another strong section. The Germans were famous for their martial ability and for ‘raging in the Teutonic fashion’ (more quasi Theutonica furentes). Unsurprisingly, chroniclers revelled in the pride afforded by this attribute, as when punning on warrior race as  

Germania germinates’ (p.367). Given the length of the volume, it would have been beneficial to see this vital formative factor in national identity explored in great depth.

This is a lucidly written book of impressive and extremely important scholarship that rewards and stimulates the reader throughout and that deserves to be cited exhaustively in future studies on this subject.

Reference


SEAN McGLYNN
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Winter and Keegan-Phipps’ newest book, probably the only one of its kind, examines the political and cultural growth of the twenty-first century English folk resurgence. To do so, they investigate question, problematise and historicise ‘the dominant hegemonic component of Britishness’ (p. 3). The focus is on the absent cultures of English folk music and dance. This theoretical work is an ethnographic study and it deals with the various facets of contemporary folk resurgence – musical, visual and discursive.

The book is organised into two equal thematic sections (both parts have three chapters excluding ‘Introduction’ and ‘Conclusion’). The book demonstrates a close reading of the contemporary folk culture, and both the authors have incorporated theory into their discussions and examinations throughout the book supported with notes, interviews, tones’ graphics, musical notes and extracts from songs, case studies, URLs and anecdotes. The overall text is amply justified and informed by the growing scholarship and references on various themes on British folk culture.

In part one, ‘Contemporary English Folk’, the chapters on ‘The Folk Industry’, ‘The Mainstreaming of English Folk’ and ‘An English Style?’ are included. This part examines the traits of contemporary English folk resurgence. Chapter 1 briefly describes how this project came into being and how the intermingling of diverse disciplines, i.e. ethnomusicology and British cultural studies, found a common methodological and theoretical ground for this project. Moreover, the authors describe all the entries that constitute the title: ‘performing Englishness’, ‘folk’ and ‘resurgence’ in the introductory chapter.

Chapter 2, ‘The Folk Industry’, presents two case studies while looking at the development of a folk industry. Readers might find the word ‘industry’ rather unconventional with ‘more-important-than-money discourses of the folk ethos’ (p. 39). But,
largely, the two types of discourses are the result of the folk industry conferences and the Magpie’s Nest. The conferences recount the rich history and tradition of folk ethos while the club activities at Magpie’s Nest examine how professionalism and commercialism come together with the folk ethos.

Chapter 3, ‘The Mainstreaming of English Folk’, searches the real (the authors mean actual when they used the word ‘real’) music and dance in the English folk arts. This chapter provides a detailed discussion on the variety of case studies and genres demonstrating the diversity of stylistic approaches to the performance, including acoustic pop, electric folk, folk-rock and dance fusion of English folk music and dance. The authors aim to construct a new English identity out of it, and they believe that folk is ‘an ideological construct that transcends style’ (p. 75). The next chapter, ‘An English Style?’ (with an interrogative mark), carries forward the argument presented in the previous chapter. The focus is on the possibility of an ‘English style’. Introspecting, rather than interrogating this issue, they deliberately assert that English folk music has a ‘culturally distinctive’ style (p. 100).

However, in part two, ‘Nation and Identity’, the focus is on questions of place and identity. Chapter 5, ‘The English Context’, rather briefly provides a contextualisation of cultural interest in Englishness where the folk resurgence is located. The title of Chapter 6, ‘A Place called England’, is from a song by Maggie Holland who received the BBC Radio 2 Folk Award. A brief extract from the song precisely demonstrates the theme of the chapter – a quest for rural idyll Old England. Where is it? In fact, this chapter does not answer this. But it works as a bridge between Chapters 5 and 7. However, it gives a hint that ‘contemporary English folk is a heterogeneous one’ (p. 130). Chapter 7, ‘Englishness’, analyses the versions of Englishness. The abstract noun implicitly indicates the authors’ intention that they want to codify a range of English identities (political and social) under construction in the resurgence. The authors recounts that ‘folk’ is no way ‘fascism’ and the English identity is ‘inherently multicultural or multi-ethnic’ (p. 156). The last chapter, ‘Conclusion’, is rather insightful. It raises broad theoretical issues ranging from folk, politics and reconciliation, Englishness as an indigeneity and with a promise to widen the research ahead.

For a reader interested in anthropology, cultural studies, ethnomusicology and ethnography, this is an important book to read. It not only provides an interesting debate about English identity but also rethinks of concepts of revival, indigeneity and tradition.

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